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MERCHANTS, THE LAW MERCHANT, AND RECENT
MISSOURI SALES CASES: SOME REFLECTIONS
WILLIAM C. JONESt
A character in a recent novel remarks, [Trade] ' so fascinating.
I The furs and amber from the Baltic, the great Volga route. Yes,
even in the darkest times, the persistence of trade. Think of Sutton
Hoo! the homage of the barbarians to civilization, that great Byzan-
tine dish !"I Who can help agreeing with her? One has only to think of
perhaps the most famous trader, Marco Polo, or his native city, Venice,
that once did "hold the gorgeous East in fee," to be removed into the
realm of pure romance.
For those whose interests are legal, there is a certain piquancy
added to this contemplation of trade by thinking of the law the ancient
traders developed. The very name that their special courts had in
England-Piepowder-is sharply evocative of a way of life that must
seem to us to be colorful in the extreme. This is reinforced by the view
Pirenne gives of them:
The sources permit us to form a pretty clear picture of the troops
of merchants, who were to be met with in greater and greater
numbers in Western Europe from the tenth century onwards.
Their members, armed with bows and swords, surrounded the
packhorses and the wagons loaded with sacks, bales, cases and
casks. At the head marched the standard-bearer (schilcrke),
and a leader, the Hansgraf or the Doyem, exercised his authority
over the company which was composed of "brothers" bound to-
gether by an oath of fidelity... From the beginning of the
twelfth century the men of Dinant were going as far as the mines
of Goslar to get supplies of copper, the merchants of Cologne,
Huy, Flanders and Rouen frequented the port of London, and
numbers of Italians were already to be seen at the Ypres fair.
Except in winter, the enterprising merchant was continually on
the road, and it was with good reason that he bore in England the
picturesque name of "dusty-foot" (pedes puveros, pfepowders).a
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
L XVILSON, ANGLO-SAxoN ATTITumEs 13 (1956).
2, PPXNNI, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MnEDzsa EUROPE 93, 94 (Har-
vest Book ed.).
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Even the way that the law these courts developed came to be assimi-
lated into the common law is far more colorful than the usual tale of
the development of legal doctrines. For it was under the aegis of one
of the greatest English judges and one of the most fascinating-Lord
Mansfield-that it was principally accomplished. The intimate of
Pope in his youth, the rival of Pitt in mid-career, admired even by
Jeremy Bentham when the latter was at Lincoln's Inn, possessor, at
his death, of one of the "stately homes of England" and a vast fortune,
Mansfield brought a truly creative mind to the problems of the com-
mon law, on many branches of which his many years on the bench
made a lasting impression2 In the field of commercial law he scored
his most signal triumph by completing the incorporation into the
common law of the law merchant. One of his chief means of accom-
plishing this was to use a special jury of merchants primarily for the
purpose of ascertaining mercantile custom.' Fittingly enough, a pleas-
ant fillip was added to the conclusion of the story of the law merchant
by Lord Campbell who, in encasing Mansfield in his collection of Chief
Justices, recalled: "Several of these gentlemen survived when I began
to attend Guildhall as a student, and were designated and honoured as
'Lord Mansfield's jurymen.' One in particular I remember Mr. Ed-
ward Vaux, who always wore a cocked hat, and had almost as much
authority as the Lord Chief Justice himself."'
Thus the history of the law merchant, as a separate institution at
any rate, came (as all history should) to a full stop,6 though a faint
trace remains in such places as Article 73 of the Uniform Sales Act.
This provides: "In any case not provided for in this act, the rules of
law and equity, including the law merchant .. . shall continue to
apply to contracts to sell and to sales of goods."
Over one-hundred-fifty years after the happy conclusion of Mans-
field's work, it may be of some interest to inquire into the question of
what has happened to what used to be the law merchant after he got
through assimilating it into the common law. In the United States we
have, as indicated in the Uniform Sales Act, followed the English lead
in absorbing the law merchant into the common law. Furthermore,
we have, of course, taken over England's commercial pre-eminence
in the world. Therefore, it should be interesting to see how those
branches of the law that used to be part of the law merchant, the law
of sales for example, are developing at the present time, say since
World War IL A good state .to pick for this purpose is Missouri, for
3. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 27-51 & passim (1936).
4. Id. at 82-117. See also Scrutton, General Survey of the Law Merchant, in 3
SELECTED ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 7 (1909); 12 HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 526 (1938).
5. 3 CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 304 n.2 (1873).
6. SELAR & YEATmAN, 1066 AND ALL THAT (1931).
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there the adaptive genius of the common law operates, in the field of
sales at least, unfettered by a restrictive statute." And, surely, it is an
apt time and place to study merchants and their sales, for here are
merchants in abundance, and they seem to be, at the present time
anyway, thriving.
Thus retail sales in Missouri were as follows: 1948, $3,526,086,000
by 47,960 establishments; 1954, $4,525,308,000 by 47,262 establish-
ments.'
The figures for wholesale transactions in 1954 were $8,209,588,000
by 7,604 establishments; in 1948 they were $6,908,475,000 by 6,919
establishments.9 The sales may be divided as follows:
ESTABLISHMENTS SALES
194$ 1954 1948 1954
Merchant
Wholesalers 3,695 4,377 $2,745,913,000 $3,248,245,000
Manufacturer's Sales
Branches 971 918 2,019,328,000 2,752,205,000
Petroleum Bulk
Stations 1,106 1,135 257,087,000 369,056,000
Agents and
Brokers 733 827 1,591,511,000 1,595,275,000
Assemblers 414 347 294,636,000 244,807,000
Figures for the value of the manufactured product shipped, less cost
of materials, supplies, fuel, and contract work are available for several
years during this period. They are: for 1947, $1,623,145,000; for
1950, $2,045,318,000; for 1952, $2,422,709,000; and for 1953, $2,-
786.,S29,000,'
In addition, mineral production in Missouri went from $74,347,000
in 1945 to $140,977,000 in 1952." In 1954 cash income from farm
marketing was $1,036,398,000." Construction contracts awarded
totaled $368,465,000 in 1950, and increased to $688,081,000 in 1955."
A roundabout way of saying the Uniform Sales Act has not been enacted
xn Missouri. Cardozo, at least, felt that the law of negotiable instruments was
prevented fronm evolutionary growth by the Negotiable Instruments Law. Man-
hattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 52,' V30 N.E. 594, 599 (1926). Of course the
principal reason Missouri was picked was that it is the state in which the writer
8. U.S. BuREAU oF THE CENsUs, DiV'T or COMnnERc, CENSUS Or BUSINESS:
1954, BULL No. R-1-25, RETAIL Tat.wr 25-5 (1956).
U.S. Buau oF Tu Cnwsus, Dr'T oF COQsscs CEwsus or Buswisss:
1954, BULL. No. W-1-25, WHOEsALs TF.4nE 25-4,46 (1956).
10. U.S. Dr'T or Comwu, fksr-rsn, ABsTRArT or run UwNrs STATS804-05 (1056).
ii M4. at 726.
12. THn ECONOMIC ALiANAc 45 (Jones ed. 1956).
13, U.S. DW'T Or Cox=sicn, op. eft. .upra note 10, at 764.
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Nor was this selling all carried on by small concerns. In St. Louis
alone for example, Anheuser-Busch had sales in 1949 of $135,304,255
which had increased by 1955 to $201,718,743 (a decline from 1953's
$237,003,969); Monsanto Chemical went from $165,924,700 in
1949 to $522,349,097 in 1955; Ralston-Purina from $243,810,370 to
$385,529,967 (down from 1952's $417,820,201) ; Bemis Brothers Bag
Company dropped from $141,506,424 in 1951 to $121,816,542 in 1955;
International Shoe Company went from $190,003,486 to $262,413,803;
Brown Shoe Company from $80,377,978 to $159,480,879; McDonnell
Aircraft Corporation from $32,659,384 to $154,588,816; Wagner Elec-
tric from $65,940,766 to $92,288,563.24 It should be noted that this list
is simply illustrative, and not by any means exhaustive even for St.
Louis, to say nothing of the remainder of the state.
Thus the period since World War II would seem to have been of the
kind most likely to produce a healthy crop of sales litigation. There
was great activity with truly gigantic quantities of goods being bought
and sold so that the chances of collision and dispute were inevitably
increased. In addition, there have been during this time violent price
fluctuations and sudden shortages, the Korean War-all incidents
likely to breed litigation. One turns, in consequence, with considerable
interest to the reports of the cases to see how the Missouri courts have
dealt with the difficult problems that must have faced them. How
well, one wonders, have they learned Mansfield's lesson of fully taking
into consideration commercial necessity and custom, while remember-
ing always that the judge has a higher standpoint and a different duty
than merely to reflect this mercantile custom. He must decide the case
not only in justice to the litigants but in the light of the legal system
as a whole, and in the interest both of the public (or the crown) and
of future litigants. Indeed, he may be able, to a degree at least, to
mold the custom which he respects since it is probably in a somewhat
inchoate state.15
These would seem to be interesting questions to consider, but it is
very difficult to answer them with reference to the courts of Missouri,
for their chief single function in the field of sales since 1945 has been
to aid or prevent the repossession of recently sold used motor vehicles
subject to conflicting claims of ownership.
Such at any rate seems the only possible conclusion that can be
reached after reading the reports of cases that have been decided by
the Missouri courts since 1945. In the South Western Reporter there
are reports of seventy-five cases decided in Missouri courts that the
14. The source for all the information in this paragraph is MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL
MANUAL (1956).
15. FIFOOT, LORD MAINSFIELD 105-17 (1936); 12 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 524-42 (1938).
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editors have indexed under the heading "Sales."7' % Conceivably, of
course, an investigation of such headings as warranty, contracts, food,
evidence, automobiles, etc., would reveal a few more cases that should
have been so categorized. Still, this heading unquestionably gets
most of them (and some rather stiange items besides).
The cases involved sales of the following items:
New automobiles 91S
all sales of single cars, save 1)
U 'sed automobiles low
(all sales of single cars)
New trucks 220
Used trucks 321
Going businesses 922
Food for consumption 32
Commodities 62
Farm machinery 42
Construction equipment 32
Construction materials 327
Misc ellaneous 232$
Total 75
16, For the purposes of this study volumes 186-2$2 of South Western Reporter,
seond settes, were checked for all cases included under "Sales" that arose in
Missouri. This series should include all reported opinions of the Supreme Court
of Mxssoui as well as the courts of appeal-Kansas City, St. Louis, and Spring-
field-including those not found in the official reports.
I7, See, e.g., Pearl v. Interstate Securities Co., 206 S.W.2d 975 (Mo. 1947).
This case was a replevin action by a seller of a used automobile against the
mortgagee of the buyer. The transfers to the seller and between seller and buyer
were void because of failure to comply with the Missouri statute on assignment
of certificates of title (MO. REV. STAT. § 301.210(4) (1949)), and the question
was whether the seller had a sufficient interest in the automobile to bring the
action. (It was held he did.) Similar issues are raised in cases indexed under
Sales." See, e.g., Riss & Co. v. Wallace, 239 Mo. App. 979, 195 S.W.2d 881(194().
18. Goodman v. Nichols, 238 Mo. App. 802, 188 S.W.2d 666 (1945); Commer-
cial Ciedit Co. v. Interstate Securities Co., 197 S.W.2d 1000 (Mo. App. 1946);
Shearer Motor Co. v. Burmeister, 216 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. A p. 1949); Boeving v.
Vandover, 240 Mo. App. 117, 218 S.W.2d 175 (1949)- etmer v. Miller, 220
SW.2d 739 (Mo. App. 1949); Dubinsky v. Lindhurg Cadillac Co., 250 S.W.2d 880(Mo. App. 1952); Universal C.J.T. Credit Corp. v. Taylor, 256 A.W.2d 303 (Mo.
App. 19,5 ; Hickerson v. Con Frazier Buick Co 264 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. App. 1953);
Mallory Motor Co. v. Overall, 279 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1905).
i9. Mound City Finance Co. v. Frank, 239 Mo. App. 807, 199 S.W.2d 902
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(1947) ; Fowler v. Golden, 240 Mo. App. 627, 212 S.W.2d 93 (1948) ; Southern Ill.
Finance Corp. v. Strubel, 228 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. App. 1950); Ruler v. M. & M.
Motor Co., 231 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. App. 1950); Robinson v. Poole, 232 S.W.2d 807
(Mo. App. 1950); Winscott v. Frazier, 236 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App. 1951); Kansas
City Automobile Auction Co. v. Overall, 241 Mo. App. 280, 238 S.W.2d 446 (1951) ;
Howard Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 243 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1951); Cantrell v.
Sheppard, 247 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. App. 1952); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Vanausdall, 241 Mo. App. 499, 249 S.W.2d 1003 (1952).
20. Riss & Co. v. Wallace, 239 Mo. App. 979, 195 S.W.2d 881 (1946); Memphis
Bank & Trust Co. v. West, 260 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App. 1953).
21. Marquis v. Pettyjohn, 212 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. App. 1948); Pheffer v. Kleb,
241 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App. 1951); Goss v. Suburban Motors, Inc., 282 S.W.2d 864
(Mo. App. 1955).
22. Hoback v. Allen, 216 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App. 1948); Johnson v. Dur-Est,
Inc., 224 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. App. 1949); Huegel v. Kimber, 359 Mo. 938 224
S.W.2d 959 (1949) ; Martin v. Ficklin, 240 Mo. App. 1225, 227 S.W.2d 69 (1650) ;
West v. Nichols, 227 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. App. 1950) ; Strafer v. Bodney, 247 S.W.2d
630 (Mo. 1952); Schroeder v. Zykan, 255 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. App. 1953); Goodrich
v. Rhodes, 261 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. App. 1953); Walters v. Larson, 270 S.W.2d 112
(Mo. App. 1954).
23. Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. App. 1948); Duley
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 232 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. App. 1950); Strawn v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 234 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. App. 1950).
24. White v. Foster, 194 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. App. 1946); Ellis Gray Milling Co.
v. Sheppard, 359 Mo. 505, 222 S.W.2d 742 (1949); Silvey v. Herndon, 234 S.W.2d
335 (Mo. App. 1950); Altenderfer v. Harkins, 243 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App. 1951 ;
Amos-James Grocery Co. v. Canners Exchange, Inc., 256 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. 1953);
Willibald Schaefer Co. v. Blanton Co., 264 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. App. 1954).
25. Stone v. Kies, 227 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. App. 1950); Dugan v. Trout, 271 S.W.2d
593 (Mo. App. 1954); Lewis v. Willingham, 274 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. App. 1955);
Heuer v. Ulmer, 281 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. App. 1955).
26. Nickerson v. Whalen, 253 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App. 1952); Witte v. Cooke
Tractor Co., 261 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. App. 1953) ; Grand River Tp., De Kalb County
v. Cooke Sales & Service, Inc., 267 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. 1954).
27. R. J. Hurley Lumber Co. v. Cummings, 264 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. App. 1954);
Smith v. Githens, 271 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. App. 1954); Young v. Hall, 280 S.W.2d
679 (Mo. App. 1955).
28. Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo 1182 186 S.W.2d 603 (1945)
(stepladder); Russell v. Union Elec. Co., 191 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. App. 1945);
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Burd & Fletcher Co., 239 Mo. App. 268, 192 S.W.2d
651 (1946) (printing machine); A. A. Elec. Mach. Co. v. Block, 193 S.W.2d
631 (Mo. App. 1946) (theatre equipment); Hall v. Watson, 201 S.W.2d 277
(Mo. 1947) (shares of stock); Oldham v. Siegfried, 202 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. App.
1947) (lien dispute over office furniture); Alvey Conveyor Mfg. Co. v. Kansas
City Terminal Ry., 356 Mo. 770, 203 S.W.2d 606 (1947) (conveyor belts); Koelling
v. Bank of Sullivan, 220 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1949) (stock in trade of a general
store); Counts v. Metzger, 228 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. App. 1950) (home-made trailers);
Zimmerman v. Jones, 241 Mo. App. 207, 236 S.W.2d 401 (1950) (aeroplane);
Davies v. Motor Radio Co., 236 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. App. 1951) (walk-in ice box);
Merit Specialties Co. v. Gilbert Brass Foundry Co., 362 Mo. 325, 241 S.W.2d 718
(1951) (hardware-bushings, unions, plugs, etc.); McCaskey Register Co. v.
Link, 242 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. App. 1951) (cash register); E. F. Drew & Co. v.
Brooks Supply Co., 243 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1951) (detergent); Worley v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (deter-
gent) ; Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corp., 363 Mo. 803, 253 S.W.2d 810 (1953)
(aeroplane); Nichols v. Wirts, 270 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1954) (sale of farm in-
cluding animals and equipment); Lerner v. Yeghishian, 271 S.W.2d 588 (Mo.
App. 1954) (carpeting); Housden v. Berns, 241 Mo. App. 1163, 273 S.W.2d 794
(1954) (house trailer); De Winter v. Lashley, 274 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App. 1954)
(tires); Sidney Smith, Inc. v. Steinberg, 280 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App. 1955) (ciga-
rettes in bulk); In re Oberman's Estate, 281 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. App. 1955) (house
and farm goods); Machctinger v. Grenzebach, 282 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1955)(electronic devices).
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Of these cases 55 per cent arose out of sales to private consumers.Y
The 1Z per cent represented by sales of businesses were not, of course,
sales of "goods" at all, except incidentally to the sale of a business.0
Approximately 33 per cent involved sales between professionals,"
that is, people or concerns in business either for resale or use in the
business and not for personal use. However, less than half of these
. Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182,186 S.W.2d 603 (1945)- Rus-
sell v. Union Elec. Co., 191 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. App. 1945) ; White v. Foster, 194 i.W.2d
723 (Mo. App. 1946); Mound City Finance Co. v. Frank, 239 Mo. App. 807 199
S.W2d 902 (1947); Oldham v. Siegfried, 202 S.W.2d 132 (MFi. Ap 1947); lar
quis v. Pettyjohn, 212 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. App. 1948); Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
215 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. App. 1948); Shearer Motor Co. v. Burmeister, 216 S.W.2d
95; (Mo. App. 1949); Boeving v. Vandover, 240 Mle. App. 117, 218 S.W.2d 175
1949); Detmer v. Miller, 220 S.W.2d 739 (Alo. App. 1949); Stone v. Kies, 227
S.W.2d 85 (Fo App. 1950); Counts v. Metzger, 228 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. App. 1950);
Southern Il. Finance Corp. v. Strube], 228 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. App. 1950); Ruler v.
M. & X. Motor Co., 231 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. App. 1950); Duley v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 232 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. App. 1950); Robinson v. Poole 232 S.W.2d 807 (Mo.
App. 1950); Strawn v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 234 S.W.2d 223 (No. App. 1950);
Silvey v. Herndon, 234 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. App. 1950); Zimmerman v. Jones, 241
Mo. App. 207, 236 SAV.2d 401 (1950); Winscott v. Frazler, 236 S.W.2d 382 (Mo.
App. 1951); Davies v. Motor Radio Co., 236 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. App. 1951); Pheffer
v. KIeb, 241 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App. 1951); McCaskey Register Co. v. Link, 242
SW.2d 281 (Mo. App. 1951); Howard Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 243
SW.2d 805 (Mo. 1951); Cantrell v. Sheppard 247 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. App. 1952);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vanausdall, 241 Mo. App. 499, 249 S.W.2d
1003 (1952); Dubinsky v. Lindburg Cadillac Co 250 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. App. 1952) ;
Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Me. kpp. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952j;
Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corp., 363 Mo. 803, 253 S.W.2d 810 (1953); Uni-
versal C.1T. Credit Corp. v. Taylor, 256 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. App. 1953); Memphis
Bank & Trust Co. v. West, 260 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App. 1953); Hickerson v. Con
Frazier Buick Co., 264 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. App. 1953); Nichols v. Wirts, 270 S.W2d
801 (Mo. 1954); Lerner v. Yeghishian, 271 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1954); Dugan
v, Trout, 271 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. App. 1954); Housden v. Bern 241 Mo. App. 1163,
273 S.W.2d 794 (1954); Lewis v. Willingham, 274 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. App. 1955);
Heuer v. Ulmer, 281 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. App. 1955); I re Oberman's Estate, 281
SW.2d 549 (Me. App. 1955); Goss v. Suburban Motors, Inc., 282 S.W.2d 864(Mo. App. 1955).
3o, See note 22 supra.
31. Goodman v. Nichols, 238 Mo, App. 802, 188 S.W.2d 666 (1945); Brandtjen
& Kluge, Inc. v. Burd & Fletcher Co., 239 Mo. App. 268, 192 S.W.2d 651 (1946);
A. A. Elec. Mach. Co. v. Block, 193 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. App. 1946); Riss &
Co. v. Wallace, 239 Mo. App. 979, 195 S.W.2d 881 (1946); Commercial Credit Co.
v. Interstate Securities Co., 197 S.X.2d 1000 (Mo. App. 1946); Alvey Conveyor
Mfg. Co. v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 356 Mo. 770, 203 S.W.2d 606 (1947);
Fowler v. Golden, 240 Mlo. App. 627, 212 S.W.2d 93 (1948); Ellis Gray Milling
Co, v. Sheppard, 359 Mo. 505, 222 S.W.2d 742 (1949); Kansas City Automobile
Auction Co. v. Overall, 241 Mo. App. 280, 238 S.W.2d 446 (1951) ; Merit Special-
ties Co. v. Gilbert Brass Foundry Co., 362 le. 325, 241 S.W.2d 718 (1951);
Altenderfer v. Harkins, 243 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App. 1951); E. F. Drew & Co. v.
Brooks Supply Co,, 243 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1951); Nickerson v. Whalen, 253
SW,2d 502 (Mo. App. 1952); Amos-James Grocery Co. v. Canners Exchange, Inc.,
256 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. 1953); Witte v. Cooke Tractor Co., 261 S.W.2d 651(Mo. App. 1953); R. J. Hurley Lumber Co. v. Cummings, 264 S.W.2d 379(Mo. App. 1954); Willibald Schaefer Co. v. Blanton Co., 264 S.W.2d 920 (Mo.
App, 1954); Grand River Tp., De Kalb County v. Cooke Sales & Service, Inc., 267
S W.2d 322 (Mo. 19,54); Smith v. Githens, 271 S.W.2d 374 (Me. App. 1954);
De Winter v. Lashley, 274 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App. 1954); Mallory Motor Co. v.
Overall, 279 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1955); Sidney Smith, Inc. v. Steinberg, 280
S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App. 1955); Young v. Hall, 280 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. App. 1955);
Machctinger v. Grenzebach, 282 S.W2d 200 (Mo. App. 1955).
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sales to professionals (or 13 per cent of the total) were sales for re-
sale, in other words, sales to merchants if the latter are defined as per-
sons who deal regularly in goods of the kind. These were sales of
five automobiles (one transaction), 32 fourteen carloads of corn
($3,453.66)," one used automobile, 4 three used automobiles,"3 de-
tergent ($1,760.18),-1 2,200 cases of #2 water pack blackberries
($3,229.03),-" ten tank cars of coconut oil ($7,110.00),3 8 tires
($689.00), 39 two new automobiles ($4,370.00), 40 and seventy-four
cases of cigarettes.41 Of the other cases which involved sales between
professionals only 4 involved large transactions. 42 The remainder in-
volved a single used automobile ($945.00) , 43 a printing machine
($1,764.37), 44 hogs ($1,350.70), 41 a used grading tractor ($4,466.-
58),4 a movable crane ($5,916.32)47 lumber and construction mate-
rials ($2,323.62) ,48 building materials ($3,999.01), 4" and electronic
devices (type unspecified, amount involved under $500.00).50
As might be expected, in view of the number of sales involving
automobiles, 20 per cent of the cases are disputes involving liens.,"
32. Commercial Credit Co. v. Interstate Securities Co., 197 S.W.2d 1000 (Mo.
App. 1946).
33. Ellis Gray Milling Co. v. Sheppard, 359 Mo. 505, 222 S.W.2d 742 (1949).
The figures in parentheses in the text refer to the amount involved in the case.
34. Fowler v. Golden, 240 Mo. App. 627, 212 S.W.2d 93 (1948).
35. Kansas City Automobile Auction Co. v. Overall, 241 Mo. App. 280, 238
S.W.2d 446 (1951).
36. E. F. Drew & Co. v. Brooks Supply Co., 243 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1951).
37. Amos-James Grocery Co. v. Canners Exchange, Inc., 256 S.W.2d 803
(Mo. 1953).
38. Willibald Schaefer Co. v. Blanton Co., 264 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. App. 1954).
39. De Winter v. Lashley, 274 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App. 1954).
40. Mallory Motor Co. v. Overall, 279 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1955).
41. Sidney Smith, Inc. v. Steinberg, 280 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App. 1955).
42. Riss & Co. v. Wallace, 239 Mo. App. 979, 195 S.W.2d 881 (1946) (tractors,
$23,750); Alvey Conveyor Mfg. Co. v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 356 Mo. 770,
203 S.W.2d 606 (1947) (conveyor belts, $25,681.39); Merit Specialties Co. v.
Gilbert Brass Foundry Co., 362 Mo. 325, 241 S.W.2d 718 (1951) (hardware-
bushings, unions, plugs, etc., $153,503.30); Smith v. Githens, 271 S.W.2d 374
(Mo. App. 1954) (asphalt concrete, $7000).
43. Goodman v. Nichols, 238 Mo. App. 802, 188 S.W.2d 666 (1945).
44. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Burd & Fletcher Co., 239 Mo. App. 268, 192
S.W.2d 651 (1946).
45. Altenderfer v. Harkins, 243 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App. 1951).
46. Nickerson v. Whalen, 253 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App. 1952).
47. Witte v. Cooke Tractor Co., 261 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. App. 1953).
48. R. J. Hurley Lumber Co. v. Cummings, 264 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. App. 1954).49. Young v. Hall, 280 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. App. 1955).
50. MYachctinger v. Grenzebach, 282 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1955).
51. Goodman v. Nichols, 238 Mo. App. 802, 188 S.W.2d 666 (1945); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Interstate Securities Co., 197 S.W.2d 1000 (Mo. App. 1946); Mound
City Finance Co. v. Frank, 239 Mo. App. 807, 199 S.W.2d 902 (1947); Oldham
v. Siegfried, 202 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. App. 1947); Counts v. Metzger, 228 S.W.2d
395 (Mo. App. 1950); Southern I. Finance Corp. v. Strubel, 228 S.W.2d 374
(Mo. App. 1950); Robinson v. Poole, 232 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. App. 1950); Pheffer
v. Kleb, 241 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App. 1951); Howard NatI Bank & Trust Co. v.
Jones, 243 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1951); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vanaus-
dall, 241 Mo. App. 499, 249 S.W.2d 1003 (1952); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v.
Taylor, 256 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. App. 1953); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. West,
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For example, disputes resulting from double financing, either by
fraud or arising out of a sale of an automobile with an outstanding
lien to a bona fide purchaser who then refinances.,5  Nineteen per cent
rnvolve breach of warranty 3' (all of quality save one arising out of an
automobile auction that involved title79. The only other legal issue
involved in a large number of the cases was rescission for fraud, mis-
take, or duress (1I per cent).+' The remainder of the cases involve a
great variety of legal issuest
260 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App. 19,53); Goodrich v. Rhodes, 261 S.W2d 391 (Mo. App.
1953); Lewis v. W llinghan, 274 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. App. 1955); Sidney Smith, Inc.
v. Steinberg, 280 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App. 1955).
5-1, See, ine C omrial Credit Co. v. Interstate Securities Co., 197 S.W.2d
1000 (Mo. App. 1946). This was an action by the entruster under a trust receipt
arranginment to replevy cars that had been entrusted to an automobile dealer
who, giving chattel mortgages, borrowed mioney on the cars from the defendant.
The plaintiff's interest prevailed.
5l3, Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 2353 Mo. 1182, 18 S.W.2d 603 (1948);
Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.Wd 314 (Mo, App. 1948); Duley v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 232 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. App. 1950); Strawn v. Coca-Cola B ttlin
Co., 234 S.W,2d 22a. (Mo. App. 1950); Davies v. Motor Radio Co., 230 6.W.25
409 (M. App. 1951); Kansas City Automobile Auction Co. v. Overall, 241 Mo.
App. 280, 23S S.W.2d 440 (19351);- McCaskey Register Co. v. Link, 242 S.W.2d
281 Mo, App. 1051); Dubinshy v. Lindburg Cadillac Co., 250 S.W2d 830 (MoApp. 19532); Worley v. Proctor -& Gamnble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. A-pp. 1114, 25S S.W9.2d
5,32 192;Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corp., 303 Mo. 803, 263 S.W.2d 810(1953); Amos-James Grocery Co. v. Canners Exchange, Inc., 250 S.W.2d 803(Mo. 1953); Lerner v. Yeghishian, 271 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1954); De Winter
v. Iashlcy, 274 S..2d 40 (No. App. 1934); cHuer v. Ulmer, 281 S.W,2d 320(Mo. App .33).
54, Kansas City Automobile Auction Co. v. Overall, 241 Mo. App. 280, 238
;,.24 4460!)1958.
Ho9, b5ack v. AlIen, 216 S.2d 148 (Mo. App, 1948) (question of repudiation
b~y seller justifying rescission by buyer); Huegel v. Limber, 359 No. 938, 224
S.W.2J I4 (1949) (fraud); Stone v. Lies 227 W.2d 85 (Mo. App . 1950) (mis-
take); Ruler v MT. & A. Motor Co., 231 W.2d 277 (Mo. App. 1950) (fraud);
Strafer v. Rodney, 247 SW.d 030 (Mo. 1952) (fraud); Schroeder v. Zykan, 255
StWh2J let (Mo. App. 19353) (fraud); Nichols v. Virts, 270 S.W.2d 801 (Mo.
1954) (duress); Housden v. Berns, 241 Mo. App. 1103, 273 S.W.2d 794 (1954)(mistake).
c A question of ageney (authority to bind principal) was involved in three:
A. A ie, Mach. Co. v. Block, 193 Setr.2d 031 (Mo. App. 1946); Silvey v. Herndon,
234 S,W.2 335 (Mlo. App. 1950); R. J1. Hurley Lumber Co. v. Cummings, 204S.W.Zd 379 (Mo. App. 1954). Three involved sales that were "fraudulent and void"'
as the result, of a failure to comply with the extremely stringent provisions of
the M issorn t statute on the assignment of the certificate of title of motor vehicles(Mo. REV. STAT. § 301.210(4) (1949));- hiss & Co. v. Wallace, 239 Mo. App.
979, 19'5 SW.2d 881 (1940); Fowler v. Golden, 240 Mo, App. 027, 212 S.W.2d
93 (1948); Winscott v. Frazier, 236 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App. 1951) Three involved
the question of whether title had passed (and did not involve the Missouri
statute): Shearer Motor Co. v. Burmeister, 210 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. App. 1949);
Boeving v. Vandover, 240 Mo. App. 117, 218 S.W.2d 175 (1949); -Ricker-
son v. Con Frazier Buick Co., 204 S.W.2d 29 (Mlo. App. 1953). Toinvolved
the roblem of risk of loss: Mallory Motor Co. v. Overall, 279 S.W.2d 532(Mo. App, 1935); Goss v. Suburban M;tors, Inc., 282 S.Wd 804 (Mo. App. 1955).
Otherwise they are quite miscellaneous: Russell v. Union Elec Co., 191 S.W.2d
278 (Ma, Aipp. 194$) (negligent installation of stove; question if seller could
escape liability because work done by independent contractor); Brandtjen &
Kluge, Inc. v.* Burd & letcher Co., 239 Mo. App. 268, 192 S.W2d 651 (1946)(questiont of waiver of breach of wvarranty); White v. Foster, 194 S.W.2d 723(Mo. App. 1940) (quantity dispute); Hall -v. Watson, 201 S.W.2d 277 (Mfo. 1947)
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The chief thing to be said about these cases is, surely, that they
are distinctly non-mercantile. Only 10 cases involve transactions in
which both parties are "merchants" as the term is defined above. Even
these cases involve relatively small amounts of money. In any event
10 (or, if one includes the 4 large transactions which, though not in-
volving sales for resale, may perhaps be described as mercantile-14)
cases are not very many for an eleven year period in which wholesale
transactions exceeded $7,000,000,000 a year.5 7 For that matter, 61
cases do not seem many to have arisen in eleven years out of retail
sales which exceeded $4,000,000,000 per year,', especially when 24, or
39 per cent, of these involved autos and trucks whereas these accounted
for only 18 per cent of the total retail sales in 1954r, (the percentage
was somewhat over 16 per cent in 194860).
What then do the merchants do with their cases? Surely they must
have more than are indicated here. One cannot believe that nearly
every sale of goods by merchant to merchant in Missouri is accom-
panied by a rosy glow of satisfaction on both sides and no cause for
things to be otherwise. There must be disputes over quality, delivery,
price, packing, risk of loss, variation in order, etc., and hence some-
thing must be done about them. Someone must be dissatisfied besides
consumers of soft drinks and purchasers of automobiles and their
(open price term); Alvey Conveyor Mfg. Co. v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 356
Mo. 770, 203 S.W.2d 606 (1947) (open price term); Marquis v. Pettyjohn, 212
S.W.2d 100 (Mo. App. 1948) (fraud); Detmer v. Miller, 220 S.W.2d 739 (Mo.
App. 1949) (question if buyer had performed); Koelling v. Bank of Sullivan, 220
S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1949) (liquidated damages); Ellis Gray Milling Co. v.
Sheppard, 359 Mo. 505, 222 S.W.2d 742 (1949) (price dispute); Johnson v. Dur-
Est, Inc., 224 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. App. 1949) (fraud); Martin v. Ficklin, 240 Mo.
App. 1225, 227 S.W.2d 69 (1950) (rights of one party on repudiation of contract
by other); West v. Nichols, 227 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. App. 1950) (construction of
contract terms); Zimmerman v. Jones, 241 Mo. App. 207, 236 S.W.2d 401 (1950)
(construction of contract terms); Merit Specialties Co. v. Gilbert Brass Foundry
Co., 362 Mo. 325, 241 S.W.2d 718 (1951) (question of mutual rescission); Alten-
derfer v. Harkins, 243 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App. 1951) (statutory liability for sell-
ing hogs with cholera); E. F. Drew & Co. v. Brooks Supply Co., 243 S.W.2d 621
(Mo. App. 1951) (construction of contract); Cantrell v. Sheppard, 247 S.W.2d
872 (Mo. App. 1952) (right of buyer to repudiate on seller's breach); Nickerson
v. Whalen, 253 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App. 1952) (failure to repair according to
contract); Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corp., 363 Mo. 803 253 S.W.2d 810
(1953) (breach of warranty of quality in a bailment); Willibaid Schaefer Co. v.
Blanton Co., 264 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. App. 1954) (priority restrictions justifying
seller's failure to ship); Grand River Tp., De Kalb County v. Cooke Sales & Ser-
vice, Inc., 267 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. 1954) (ultra vires contract); Walters v. Larson,
270 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. App. 1954) (fraud); Smith v. Githens, 271 S.W.2d 374
(Mo. App. 1954) (contract reformation); Dugan v. Trout, 271 S.W.2d 593 (Mo.
App. 1954) (compliance with conditions of warranty) ;Young v. Hall, 280 S.W.2d
679 (Mo. App. 1955) (question whether recovery was to be on contract or in
quantum meruit); In 'e Oberman's Estate, 281 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. App. 1955)
(question if transfer a sale or gift); Machctinger v. Grenzebach, 282 S.W.2d 200(Mo. App. 1955) (question if payment made).
57. See note 9 s-upra.
58. See note 8 supra.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
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financers. These disputes must be settled in some way since commerce
goes on, indeed burgeons.
One thing that is obviously done is to bring them into the federal
courts. The reports of cases indexed by West under "Sales" in the
Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement,' show 20 cases which arose
n Missouri and were decided during the period-8 in the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and 12 in the district courts of Mis-
souri. Further, an analysis of these cases gives different results than
the analysis of those decided in the Mlissouri state courts.
They cannot be satisfactorily categorized according to the subject
matter of the dispute since there is only one classification in which
more than two cases can be grouped. This consists of "commodities"
which were the subject matter of 6 cases or 30 per cent of the total.
These were: feed/ corn, , soybean oil meal, 4 rice," molasses,"" and
potatoes., ' There were two cases involving the warranty of a manu-
facturer of foodstuffs to the ultimate consumer,/ and similar ones
involving tires, and an automobile.c, The others involved pressing
machines,' shares of stock- a bull for breeding,/ oil and gas storage
tanks," steejw paint/s, candy ,vrappers.7 a used refrigerator/ and
a going business.$'
As indicated, only 4 cases, or 20 per cent, were of sales to con-
t Vo5s. 8436 of the Fedeiai Supplement, and 146-228 of the Federal Re-
porter, second series, were consulted. (Actually there were twenty-one if Buder
v. Becker, 185 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1950) is included. However, it arose out of the
same cause of action as Becker v. Buder, 88 F. Supp. 609 (1949), motions for new
trial de ,cd, 88 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Mo. 1950>.>.
62_. Farmers Elevator Sex'' Co. v. Hogan, 85 F. Supp, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
(3. Good v. Green, 90 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
64. Hogan v. Barnett & Co., 179 F.24d 836 (8th Cir, 1950).
65. MAiravalle Supply Co. v. El Campo Rice Miling Co., I81 F.2d 679 (8th
Ch" 1150).
66. National Molasses Co. v. Herring, 221 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1955).
67, J. R. Simplot Co. v. L. Yukon & Son Produce Co., 227 F.2d 67 (8tM Cir.
1955)
68. Williams v. Cam pbell Soup Co., 80 F. Sup p. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948); Mc-
Intyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co,, 85F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
69. Wessley v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 90 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
70. Dennis v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., II F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
7I. United States HofFman Mach. Corp. v. Larehli, 150 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1945).
72. Becker v. Buder, 88 F. Supp. 609 (1949), motions far new trIal denied, 88
F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Mo.), a/fd, 185 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1950).
73. Miller v. Penney, 77 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Mo. 1948),
74. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Shondell, 174 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1949);
J. B. Beaird Co. v. Consumers Cooperative Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 193 (Wi). Mo.
195 ).
75, Duiasteel Co. v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 205 F.2d 438 (Sth Civ. 1953).
76. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co. v. Steelcote Mfg. Co., 110 F. Supp. 757(E.D. Uo. 1953).
77. Milprint, Inc. v. Donaldson Chocolate Co., 222 F2d 89$8 (8th Cir. 1955).
78. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Frigidaire Sales Corp., 113 F. Supp. 405(E.D. Mo. 1953).
79. !n r" Venie, 80 F. Supp. 250 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
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sumers" (unless one includes the case of Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co.
v. Fiigidaire Sales Corp.,81 which arose out of a consumer sale, though
the immediate dispute was between the retailer's insurance company
which paid off the claim, and the manufacturer). Six of the cases, 82
or 30 per cent, involved sales to professionals not for resale. Seven,,"
or 35 per cent, involved sales to merchants for resale. 4
Breach of warranty was the issue involved more often than any
otherA' Otherwise, the existence of mutual rescission or repudiation
by one party justifying the other's failure to perform were the prin-
cipal issues. 6 In addition, the cases involved questions of when de-
livery has been made,T conflicting forms (order and invoice),"" the
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act,89 uncertainty making the
80. Williams v. Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948); Mc-
Intyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949);
Wessley v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 90 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Dennis v.
Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
81. 113 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Mo. 1953).
82. United States Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Larchli, 150 F.2d 301 (8th Cir.
1945); Miller v. Penney, 77 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Mo. 1948); Black, Sivalls &
Bryson, Inc. v. Shondell, 174 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1949); J. B. Beaird Co. v. Con-
sumers Cooperative Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Mo. 1951); Durasteel Co. v.
Great Lakes Steel Corp., 205 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1953); Milprint, Inc. v. Donaldson
Chocolate Co., 222 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1955).
83. Farmers Elevator Serv. Co. v. Hogan, 85 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Mo. 1949)
($12,086.00); Good v. Green, 90 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. Mo. 1950) ($28,673.03-judgment was for $123.03); Hogan v. Barnett & Co., 179 F.2d 836 (8th Cir.
1950) ($6,740.00); Miravalle Supply Co. v. El Campo Rice Milling Co., 181 F.2d
679 (8th Cir. 1950) ($11,958.15); Froedtert Grain & Malting Co. v. Steelcote
Mfg. Co., 110 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Mo. 1953) ($3,701.48); National Molasses Co.
v. Herring, 221 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1955) (amount unknown-difference betveen
contract price for eleven tank cars of molasses and market price); J. R. Simplot
Co. v. L. Yukon & Son Produce Co., 227 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1955) (under $500.00).
84. The remainder of the federal cases-In re Venie, 80 F. Supp. 250 (W.D.
Mo. 1948), and the Buder cases (see note 72 supra)-are, of course, rather special
since the former involved the sale of a business, and the latter a probate matter.
85. Miller v. Penney, 77 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Mo. 1948); Williams v. Campbell
Soup Co., 80 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948); McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949) ; Wessley v. Seiberling Rubber Co.,
90 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Froedtert Grain & Malting Co. v. Steelcote
Mfg. Co., 110 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Mo. 1953) ; Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Frigi-
daire Sales Corp., 113 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Mo. 1953); Milprint, Inc. v. Donaldson
Chocolate Co., 222 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1955).
86. Farmers Elevator Serv. Co. v. Hogan, 85 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Mo. 1949)(mutual rescission); Good v. Green, 90 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. Mo. 1950) (delay in
delivery justifying buyer's repudiation); Hogan v. Barnett & Co., 179 F.2d 836(8th Cir. 1950) (buyer's repudiation justifying seller's failure to ship); Dura-
steel Co. v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 205 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1953) (mutual re-
scission).
87. United States Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Larchli, 150 F.2d 301 (8th Cir.
1945) ($4,337.36). This case was a reorganization proceeding and the dispute
was between the holder of chattel mortgages on the machines and the trustee in
bankruptcy.
88. National Molasses Co. v. Herring, 221 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1955).
89. J. R. Simplot Co. v. L. Yukon & Son Produce Co., 227 F.2d 67 (8th Cir.
1955).
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contract unenforceable," uncertainty of the price set by contract,,
and cash sale (passage of title) ."
The "Sales" cases that are decided in the federal courts are, thus,
predominantly mercantile. The majority of them are disputes between
merchants. They involve the sale of substantial (though not much in
excess of the amount necessary to get into the federal court) quanti-
ties of goods, for resale. But one could scarcely say the federal courts
ti Missouri are thronged with quarrelling merchants. There are only
20 cases in all. Twenty cases in eleven years, or less than 2 per
year, does not seem many considering the gigantic volume of sales.
Furthermore, though they constitute the majority, only 13 of these
cases were mercantile-i.e., involved something more than the sale of
goods to consumers at retail. Coupled with the 24 similar cases in the
state courts, this makes 37 mercantile cases in all, or slightly over 3
per year. Or, if one includes only sales to "merchants," 17 cases in
all, or less than 2 per year'
What do all of these figures mean for the law merchant in Missouri?
First, that there has not been any substantial law merchant developed
n the courts of Missouri in the years since rorld War H1. Insofar as
there have been any judicial developments within the state they must
m.. B. Beaird Co. v. Consumers Cooperative Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 193 (WJY,Mo, 1951).
9, Miravalle Supply Co. v. El Campo Rice Milling Co., 181 F.2d 256 (8th
'it. 1950).
!2. ,' c Venie, 80 F. Supp. 250 (WD. Mo. 1948).
Et The amounts involved are indicated in parentheses after the citations in
ote g:j mpr
94. The Teva issues in the Missouri mercantile cases were as follows (these
Vases ate listed above in the appropriate categories, but it is believed that it may
[ie convenient to have them listed together): Commercial Credit Co. v. Interstate
Securities Co., 197 S.W.2d 1000 (Mo. App. 1946) (dispute between conflicting
lien holders); Ellis Gray Milling Co. v. Sheppard 359 Mo. 505, 222 S.W.2d 742
(1949 (price dispute); Kansas City Automobile Auction Co. v. Overall, 241 Mo.
Npp. 280, 238 S.W.2d 446 (1951) (breach of warranty of title); R. F. Drew &
Co. v. Brooks Supply Co., 248 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1951) (construction of con-
t ,act: question if certain additional provisions had been added, and, if so, whether
complied with); Amos-James Grocery Co. v. Canners Exchange, Inc., 256 S.W.2d
80.3 (Mo. 1953) (breach of warranty); Willibald Schaefer Co. v. Blanton Co., 264
S.W2d 920 (Mo. App. 1954) (priority restriction justifying failure to ship);
I)e Winter v. Lashley, 274 S.W.2d 40 (Me. App. 1954) (breach of warranty);
Mallory Motor Co. v. Overall, 279 S.W.2d 532 (go. App. 1955) (risk of loss-
,uestion of title passing-cash sale); Sidney Smith, Inc. v. Steinberg, 280 S.W.2d(9w; (Mo. App. 1955) (rights of bona fide purchaser against lien holder). The
Federal cases are: United States Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Larchli, 150 F.2d 301(8th Cr. 1945) (validity of chattel mortgages against trustee in bankruptcy);
Farme s Elevator SerWv Co. v. Hogan, 85 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (ques-
ton of mutual rescission); Good v. Green, 90 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. Mo. 1950)(fadure of delivery justifying repudiation by buyer), Hogan v. Barnett & Co.,
179 F.2d 836 (8th Cir. 1950) (question of repudiation; Uiravalle Supply Co. v.
El Campo Reice Milling Co., 181 F2d 679 (8th Cir. 1950) (dispute over price due
tInder contract); Froedtert Grain & Malting Co. v. Steelcote Mfg. Co., 110 F.
Supp. 7,57 (E.D. Mo, 1953) (breach of express warranty); National Molasses Co,
v. Her ing, 221 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1955) (conflicting forms-purchase orders
versus confirmation); J. R. Simplot Co. v. L. Yukon & Son Produce Co., 227 F2d
G7 (8th Cir. 1955) (action under Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act).
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have come as much if not more in the federal courts operating on the
fiction that they were applying Missouri law when in fact, as has been
seen, there was almost no Missouri law-at least not active, during the
period.95
95. It can be urged that it does not take more than one case to establish a
rule of law, and once a rule is established, counsel on both sides will simply refer
to it, and litigation will be unnecessary: thus a lack of cases simply indicates a
condition of legal certainty. In answer to this, it is perhaps enough to say that
probably most cases turn on disputed questions of fact rather than law, hence
certainty as to law does not prevent litigation. Furthermore, rules of law are,
after all, just conditional statements of fact, hypothetical or actual- if A is true
then B will follow; if the defendant negligently struck plaintiff with his automo-
bile, then the plaintiff can recover. Rarely will the protasis exacty agree with the
facts in the particular case, hence, under the impact of new cases or fact situa-
tions, it will be necessary to complicate it-if the defendant struck the plaintiff
with his automobile, and was negligent, and the plaintiff was not also negligent,
and the plaintiff suffered injury, the plaintiff may recover, etc. One may even-
tually change the apodosis (the plaintiff may not recover, or may recover to the
extent that he was not negligent), or, if one does not, the rule of law will still
be changed or at least modified, since so many qualifications will have been
added. For an instance, see Davis, A Re-exaniination of the Doctrine of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick and its Application and Extension in the State of New York,
24 FORDAHM L. REV. 204 (1955). See also, in the same connection, LEACH, FUTURE
INTERESTs 736-803, especially 736-38, 752-55 (2d ed. 1940), where the development
of the Rule Against Perpetuities from the Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22
Eng. Rep. 931 (1682), is traced and its gradual shaping under changing fact
situations shown. So here, in the one sector of this field in which there is much
litigation-suits for breach of implied warranty by consumers against manufac-
turers-the principal disputes are over facts, and the rules of law are gradually
changing.
It is apparently well-settled in Missouri that there is manufacturer's liability
in the case of food, beverages, and drugs sold for human consumption, yet there
were during the period of this study three cases decided by the courts of appeals in-
volving suits against Coca-Cola bottling companies for impurities of various types
discovered in Coca-Cola bottles. There have been two additional cases during the
past year. In the first case, Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.
App., St. Louis 1948), little was said in the opinion about liability for breach of
warranty, though it was mentioned in passing (id. at 316). The disputed questions
were whether plaintiff's injuries were caused by the tacks in the Coca-Cola bottle,
whether the foreign matter could have got into the bottle afer leaving defendant's
hands, and whether it was improper to permit cross-examination of defendant's
manager on whether new machinery had been installed after this occurrence (on
this point, there was a reversal of the trial court's judgment for plaintiff). In
Duley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 232 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. App., St. Louis 1950), it
was conceded that plaintiff might recover on breach of implied warranty, but
defendant contended that plaintiff's evidence did not show that her illness resulted
from the safety pin, etc., in the bottle or that her injury was substantial. In
Strawn v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 234 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. App. 1950), decided two
months later by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, the question of liability for
breach of warranty was not mentioned, the disputed questions were whether the
evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that impurities (cigar butts,
etc:) were in the bottle when delivered by the manufacturer to the seller, and
whether they caused the plaintiff's illness. In Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. App., St. Louis 1955), the defendant urged that the court over-
rule previous decisions and hold that suits for breach of implied warranty against
the manufacturer may not be maintained. This the court declined to do. It did,
however, reverse a decision for the plaintiff on the ground of failure of proof
that defendant manufactured and sold the particular bottle of Coca-Cola, that
foreign matter was present when it was delivered to the shop, and that the
foreign matter was dangerous and impure and injured plaintiff's health. In
Leathers v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 286 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. App., Spring-
field 1956) the issue of liability was not mentioned. The questions were whether
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Of course, in theory the "law" is always there--"a brooding omni-
presence"-and when a mercantile case comes before a Missouri court,
it can apply this "law" which will then be revealed for all to see. As a
practical matter this is not too far of the mark since with the riches
of the West reporting system it is unlikely that a case will come before
a Missouri court for which there is not, somewhere within the United
States, an at least apparent analogue, though it be an Ohio nisi prius
report. "' And, if one can cite a case, one is not, of course, making law,
but simply declaring what is.
But it may be wondered if, though possibly the law merchant, this is
really merchants' law. Without making any effort to arrive at a
general definition of law, it does seem that the law relating to a par-
ticular human activity, such as marriage, or to particular types of
men, such as merchants, should consist of the rules by which disputes
in this area or among these men are settled. And this does not seem to
e true of this sales law in Missouri, or at any rate, not in the usual
sense. For there are, it will be remembered, only 95 reported cases
for both state and federal courts for eleven years: years in which the
defendant sold the Coca-Cola in question (it contained photographic film) and
whether plaintiff suffered any injury. There were also some evidentiary points.
In Wo ly v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (St.
Lous 19,52), the question of liability for breach of warranty (the plaintiff allegedly
suffered skin injuries from using defendant's soap powder, Tide--"new washing
miracle," "and of course Tide is kind to hands, too") was discussed at length.The Coca-Cola cases were cited, and a detergent was put in the category of food,
beverages, and drugs and hence "plaintiff's case does not fail for failure to allege
and prove privity between the parties." Id. at 1122, 253 S.W.2d at 537. However,
it did fail for failure to prove that Tide caused the injury.
IN the federal courts there have been three cases. The first involved a bottle
of Coca-Cola, but was an instance of injury resulting from the bottle exploding
rathei than impurities in the beverage. This was McIntyre v. Kansas City CocaCola Biottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949). The district judge said that
it was clear, at least under the decisions of the Missouri courts of appeals (there
was sw)e doubt about the supreme court which has not often dealt with theproblem) that there is, in Missouri, an implied warranty of fitness of food and
drink s:old for human consumption; that there is liability of the manufacturer
where goods are bought and sold for a particular purpose (wearing a blouse on
the stage under bright lights as opposed to merely wearing a blouse, perhaps);
and that there is no implied warranty of merchantability. Accordingly plaintiff
could i ecover, if at all, only on a tort theory for negligence. There are two sub-
sequent cases, both in the western district of Missouri, though only one before
the judge who wrote the AlcIntyre opinion. In both Wessley v. Seiberling Rubber
Co ., 90 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mo. 1950), in an action by a consumer purchaser of
tires against the manufacturer, and Dennis v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 111
F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Mo. 1953), a suit by the purchaser of an automobile against
the manufacturer, recovery was denied on the ground of lack of privity.
Thus a clear rule of law with some refinements did not prevent extensive
litigation. Further, so far as the Coca-Cola cases are concerned (and other
food and beverage cases, presumably, if they should arise), some rather refined
rules are developing on the problem of proving that the impurity could not have
entered the bottle after it left the bottler's hands and before being drunk by
the plaintiff.
96. To be sure, of course, Ohio nisi prius cases are not currently included in
the North Eastern Reporter but must be sought afield in Ohio Opinions Annotated.
West does publish the same type of thing in the New York Supplement, but I
have always liked the name Ohio nisi prius for some reason.
Washington University Open Scholarship
412 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
annual wholesale (sales between merchants) sales figure exceeded
$7,000,000,000 per year, and the value of the annual manufactured
product was over $1,000,000,000. And the cases that there were in-
volved situations that would seem apt to occur with some frequency:
a contract for "washed" potatoes and those delivered allegedly caked
with mud;97 whether the contract (evidenced by conflicting forms)
provided Ist September or 30th September as the cut-off date for de-
liveries ;08 whether specially ordered candy wrappers were defective
when delivered or deteriorated through the buyer's delay in using
them 9 (the three Missouri sales cases decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit during 1955). Were there no other similar
cases, and if there were, why were they not reported? To be sure, the
fact that they were not reported would not prove that no action was
brought since even in the federal courts a minority of decisions of
courts at nisi prius are reported, and in the state courts (in Missouri,
as in most states) none at all. Further, of course, a minority of cases
tried are appealed. 00 Still the number tried, especially the mercantile
cases, seems certain to be less than one would imagine. (If there
should be a vast number of cases tried and almost none appealed this
would be a subject for investigation in itself. It seems unlikely.)
Apparently, it may be added, this is nothing new. It has been asserted
that there were only 13 cases decided by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri involving implied warranties in the 124 years prior to 1945 and
only 89 by the courts of appeal in the 69 years before 1945.101 One
may consequently well ask what happened to the cases that did not get
into the courts?
Obviously we do not know, and cannot know, without an exhaustive
survey of the practices of Missouri merchants. Commercial arbitration
is, of course, a possibility, but there is no evidence that it exists in
large quantity and the evidence elsewhere tends to show that it is most
used in fairly tightly organized exchanges and trade associations.1 -
It is probable that many disputes are settled by agreements between
the parties, frequently with advice of counsel. When this happens-
when counsel is called in-then clearly court decisions are very influen-
97. J. R. Simplot Co. v. L. Yukon & Son Produce Co., 227 F.2d 67 (8th Cir.
1955).
98. National Molasses Co. v. Herring, 221 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1955).
99. Milprint, Inc. v. Donaldson Chocolate Co., 222 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1955).
100. The figure for the federal courts in the country at large is approximately
four cases tried for one appealed. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 145-46 (1955). However, this figure includes criminal
cases in which the percentage of appeals is undoubtedly higher than in sales
cases as it doubtless is in patent and some other cases.
101. Overstreet, Some Aspects of Implied Warranties in the Supreme Court
of Missouri, 10 Mo. L. REy. 147, 186 (1945).
102. This observation is based primarily on an examination by the writer of
the records of the commercial cases arbitrated under the auspices of the American
Arbitration Association.
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tial, for counsel's advice will doubtless be based on, or at least start
from, a memorandum on the "law," which must include cases from
other states as well as Missouri. One wonders, though, if there are not
other-perhaps more--cases where counsel are not called in, and yet
sernous disputes arise and are settled. On what basis? Is there a pat-
tern of conduct in these settlements, or do the parties simply dicker
back and forth in an aimless fashion, with the final settlement being
the result of chance? Even if counsel is called in, is the result always
foreordained according to what his memorandum shows the law to be?
Is there not a tendency for memoranda to show the law in such a state
as to permit the client to do the thing he is determined to do with
some chance of winning if he should be challenged in court? A sort of
brief in advance of the law suit in other words? Obviously, anything
one sa.s in this regard must be surmise, but I would suggest that the
probability is that merchants have, ordinarily, no intention of having
a law suit, and that their negotiations are carried on with this premise
in mind. Further, it is obvious that the relative economic position of
buyer and seller is extremely influential in the way settlements are
reached. In other words, if a large buyer, say a chain of department
stores, receives an order of blouses from a small manufacturer which
it regards as not up to the standard which it ordered (perhaps because
of the type of cloth used), the buyer will expect, and will probably
receive, either a price allowance, or a full right of return, depending
on it, desires and the custom of the trade. If, on the other hand, the
boyer is a small manufacturer, and the seller is, say, a large manu-
facturer of steel for which there is a heavy demand and short supply,
the seller may well be able to refuse to accept returns or, at any rate,
of fer a smaller price allowance than in the former case. There may be
similar customs in connection with disputes over the time, place, and
manner of delivery: a certain leeway as to the percentage of spoilage
pvrmitted in the sale of perishables, for example.
Probably there are few who would dispute this, and yet many might
wonder if it is not simply laboring the obvious (displaying the temper
of the novelist who defined a sociologist as one who spends $40,000 to
find a brother 0' '). Everyone knows, after all, that most disputes,
whether in the commercial field or out of it, are settled without re-
course to the courts. Courts deal with the unusual, the pathological
situation in all areas. Conceivably these observations may be valid
ones. Perhaps the percentage of commercial disputes that reach the
courts is not appreciably different than, say, that of personal injury
cases, disputes arising out of employment disputes (though, of course,
in the latter area, if there is a collective bargaining agreement, there
1( 3. Quoted, though not by name, in Homans, Giving a Dog a Bad Name, 66
TiE LISTENER 232, 233 (1956).
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will be an elaborate extrajudicial grievance procedure in all proba-
bility), land transaction disputes, etc. Even if this is true, however,
one still wants to know why this case and not that one-what are the
criteria that the merchant uses to decide when to litigate and when
not? Furthermore, and more importantly, what happens to the cases
that do not get into court? How are they settled? Are there rules,
patterns of results (articulated and conscious-known to the parties-
or otherwise) ?
The answers to these questions are, it is believed, quite important
to our understanding of sales law. When we say the law of sales, we
ordinarily mean the cases decided by the courts of a particular juris-
diction (or the majority of states if we are speaking nationally) in
the fields of warranty, delivery, passage of title, risk of loss, etc. From
these one can induct rules of law, or predictions as to what the courts
will do in similar situations. 04 This is supposedly a help both in pre-
paring for litigation and in advising a client on what course of action
to take to avoid litigation. They are presumably the guides for action
of the mercantile community even though no criminal sanctions attach
for their violation-just as the rules of probate and conveyancing law
guide men in preparing wills and transferring realty. If, however, it
is most unlikely that a case will get into court, then what the court
will do if it should get the case may very well not be of much impor-
tance or influence. Other considerations will determine men's actions.
If there is any law, it is derived from other sources. My guess would
be that there is a fair degree of certainty or standardization in the
practice of merchants, but that it is based on tacitly held, inarticulated,
norms of conduct.
Or, one might say, that a modern businessman or merchant has a
pretty good idea of what proper business behavior is in the sense that
in a situation in which he is at the moment involved he has a strong
feeling as to what is the right thing to do. When he is involved in
disputes with another, though he may well strive for the greatest
possible advantage from the situation, he will not attempt to push his
opponent too far, nor refuse to give way himself. There is room for
adjustment, but limits beyond which the reasonable prudent business-
man will not go. If he does, he acquires a bad reputation. And he does
not, except under extreme circumstances (of which intense personal
irritation is doubtless one and financial emergency another). Presum-
ably the norms differ from industry to industry and from trade to
trade. What would be sharp practice in one line may be typical be-
havior in another.
104. There is some doubt as to whether there is such a thing as "induction"
in this sense, and it has been asserted, "that what passes as induction is either
disguised deduction or more or less methodical guesswork." COHEN, A PREFACE
TO LoGiC 33 (Meridian ed. 1956).
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The type of behavior suggested would fit the pattern of the develop-
ment of the law merchant. For this law was truly merchants' law: it
was created by merchants. It is well known that it was created by
mercantile, and not by the common-law courts.'0 But it may not be
realized that these mercantile courts were not courts with lawyers
and judges in our sense. Rather, they were fora at which a dispute
between merchants could be submitted promptly to other merchants
to decide what the custom of merchants was in regard to it (without
the delays attendant on actions in the common-law courts) 1. The
essential features that differentiated the law merchant from the com-
mon law were not regarded (at the time at least) as being of sub-
stance but rather of procedure. 07 Obviously then, changing trade
practices and methods of doing business would be quickly reflected in
the decisions of the courts. One can conceive of the merchants dis-
cussing umsual cases or situations as they went from fair to fair or
talked in the evenings after the day's transactions were complete.
They may also have talked of new ways of doing business that some-
(ow had heard of, probably from the Italians, and considered the possi-
bility of adopting them, and, at any rate, discussed their merits and
demerits2' It was not the courts that influenced or shaped mercantile
105, Ser, I HowswoRTa, A HrsTorY OF Ewousa LAw 538-39 (7th ed. 1956);
id. 6n 129 (31d ed. 1945). For Europe generally, see HUxnwN, Essu1 HISTORIQuz
SI'R Lv Duo:? DES MARoCts zr DES FoiREs 211-39 (1897).
106. See note 105 ospra. See also I Swox Socizry, SEuCT CASEs CoN-
(*KXNN' TItM LAW MERCHANT xxii*xxv (Gross ed. 1908). These references are
to the fair courts, but a similar procedure was employed by the courts of the
staple (Ni. at nwii). Merchants also used the borough courts (id. at xx-ni).
See also 1 SEMOoN SOcErY, BoRovtH CusToxis 183-92 (Bateson ed. 1904) (in-
stances of merchant and fair law in courts of London, Bristol, Ipswich, Water-
ford, Cork, Dublin, Kilkenny, Norwich, Torksey, and Rye).
I 07. See note 106 vipra. See also, I THE LITTLE Run BOOK OF BRISTOL 57
(Bickley ed. 1900). This book-a reprint of a manuscript record book of the city
of Bristol-eontains the only contemporary medieval English treatise on the law
merchant. It dates probably from the 14th century. The anonymous author lists
three principal ways in which the common law differs from the law merchant.
Unfortunately, he lists them in Latin which Mr. Bickley failed to translate.
Apparently (on the basis of my own very unconiddent translation): "The law
of the market [Jex wercati, the paragraph heading is lex mercatoria, the law
merchant] differs from the common law of the kingdom in three ways: first be-
cause the decision is speedier, Second, because he who pledges to make answer
to the trespa ... pledges for the whole debt Including damages and costs ....
And the third way in which it differs is that under it no one is permitted to wage
his law [to introduce proof perhaps] on the negative side, but always, according
to this law, it is for the plaintiff to prove his case whether by secta [confirming
witnesses] or by the deed [facturn] or both, and not for the defendant." All,
obviously, are procedural miatters. It should be added that one can say that
medieval law of all sorts was primarily concerned with procedure, and hence it
would naturally be in the procedural area that a contemporary writer would look
for possible differences between the two bodies of law. It is, in any event, clear
that mei chants created their own law.
168. It has been said that "in 1500 there was a lag of perhaps two centuries
between the commercial and financial methods of the Hanseatic merchants and
those of the Italians." 2 CAmSWGE, ECONOMIC HISTORY or EURoPs 291 (1952).
English practice would, of course, have advanced no farther, if as far, as that
of the Germans,
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practice, but the contrary. We shall probably never know exactly how
the various branches of law that we associate with the traditional
law merchant-agency, insurance, partnership, negotiable instru-
ments, sales, etc.-developed since the records of merchants and their
courts are quite fragmentary. 0 9 But it does seem clear that they were
the gradual creation of the merchants themselves.
There is no reason to suppose that the process has stopped. On the
other hand, quite the reverse seems to be the case as is seen in the
rules of clearing houses, exchanges, and trade associations. Bankers,
in addition, have recently been making a very conscious effort to
change the liabilities of parties under letters of credit without resort
to court or legislature."0 There are business school texts that are
quite explicit in their instructions as to the proper policies to be fol-
lowed on returns of merchandise. One text contains the following ad-
vice:
Adjustment Policy.... It is always advisable to proceed on the
assumption that the customer is right and to investigate claims
carefully before they are refused. In fact, it may even be expedi-
ent to allow all claims that are honestly made as a means of paving
the way for future business and good-will. In any case, the cus-
tomer should be treated fairly, although it may sometimes be
advisable not to yield weakly to every request for allowance, par-
ticularly when dealing with business men. . . . If adjustments
are made in a grouchy and begrudging manner, sufficient good-
will is lost so that they might as well not have been made at all.
Returned Goods Privilege. . . . Although wholesalers seldom
have to accept returned merchandise in excess of 3% of sales, the
problem is sufficiently important to require the adoption of a defi-
nite policy with regard to the liberality with which returned
goods shall be accepted. . . . [R] eturns may be made because of
merchandising errors on the part of the vendor many of which
can be removed through careful analysis, or because of the cus-
tomer's lack of responsibility and appreciation of business ethics.
A policy must therefore be adopted that will take cognizance
of such possibilities and that will govern the extent to which
returned goods shall be accepted where the seller is not at fault.
A limit on the time within which returns must be made will also
help considerably in this connection.",
It seems quite probable that the development of the law merchant by
merchants continues outside the courts.
109. See, e.g., 1 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MER-
CHANT xiv-xv (Gross ed. 1908); LOPEZ & RAYIOND, MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN WORLD 6 (1955).
110. See the discussion of the "Uniform Customs, and Practices for Commercial
Documentary Credits fixed by the Thirteenth Congress of the International
Chamber of Commerce" in Mentschikoff, Letters of Credit: The Need for Uniform
Legislation, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 572-81 (1956).
111. MAYNARD & BECKMAN, PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING 564-66 (4th ed. 1946).
See also FREY, MANUFACTURERS' PRODUCT PACKAGE AND PRICE POLICIES 79-86
(1940), where repair, installation, and inspection services are dealt with.
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If this is true, just how it is developing, just what processes are at
work to create new rules and enforce old ones, we do not know. Nor
can we, without fairly exhaustive examination of the actual practices
of businessmen. It is to be hoped that such an examination may some-
time be made, for it would produce information that would be ex-
tremely useful even for the practicing lawyer since currently one of
his most difficult tasks is to get enough of a feel for the operating
reality of his client's situation to be able to give him useful advice
(as opposed to that which is merely "correct" legally). For that mat-
ter, courts are frequently responsive to evidence of business practice.Y
Most of all, however, such information should be of immense inter-
est to the sociologist particularly when defined as one who tries
to find out what are basic phenomena and relationships of society
in all its aspects: political, legal, literary, artistic, economic, etc.;
what are the relationships between these various aspects of social
life, and in what ways do they interact upon each other. ... He
tries to find out what there is in common in all those social activi-
tics which constitute the subject-matter of the specialized sci-
ences, how they influence and interact upon each other, in our
society as well as in societies of other cultures, past and present,
developed or primitive. Understood in this sense, sociology is
basic for all social and natural sciences, its aim being the discov-
ery of those ultimate units of society which might, in a sense, be
called the atoms of the social structure, the type-patterns accord-
mg to which the boundless manifold of social phenomena may be
taxonmically classified, and, lastly, to find out what regularities,
i f any, one might find in the coincidence or sequence of social
pih enonlena."1
For such a person there are few more fruitful aspects of society to
in'. estigate than the way it forms and enforces its laws. This is clearly
recogmized in the case of primitive societies whose law-ways receive
the closest attention by the anthropologist.'" In this country, how-
evwer, the study of law, except in a few isolated areas such as constitu-
tional law and international law, is left to lawyers, and they study it
primarily as developed in the opinions of appellate courts, although the
majority of lawyers probably do almost no trial, to say nothing of
appellate, work.
1 12. See, e.g., Dixon Irnaos & Cia. Ltda. v. Chase Natl Bank, 144 F.2d
759,, (2d Cir. 1944), eert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945), where evidence of a custom
of bankers, exporters, and importers in New York to accept a guaranty in lieu
of a issing bill of lading was held to justify the selle's failure to present a full
set of bills of lading in presenting a draft for payment under a letter of credit
calling for "full set bills of lading."'
I13. WEaER, LAW IN EcoNowr AND SocisTr xxvfi (Rheinstein ed. 1954).
1 14. For a recent book that deals with several bodie of primitive law and
shows its possible relations and significance for "law" in general see Housa,
Tit: LAW or P aIntV MTAN (194). For examples of more detailed studies of
particular bodies of primitive law with the same emphasis, see Homm & Lr.,sw-
SLLYN, THE C n-'nNNE WAY (1941); GLvCKMiAN, THE JunrioAz No ss AMoNG
TIFl BARMsE OF NORTIMEN RHODESIA (19M5).
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But perhaps it is all of little concern to the merchant, who will
simply do as he knows he should since, as Defoe wrote in 1727:
1. He understands himself better than to be continually embar-
rassing himself in Suits at Law; falling upon his Fellow-Trades-
men with Heat and Passion, making Quarrels for the sake of
them, and pursuing Advantages as if he liv'd by them; 'tis quite
out of his Way; he does not relish Strife.
2. He understands Trade better than to push every Debtor to
Extremity, and tear Men to Pieces just when he knows they can-
not answer his Demand; when he knows that by Patience, and a
little Forbearance, the Debt may be got in, that by Violence would
be at least in Danger of being lost.
3. He knows the Value of his Money better than to throw it away
in Prosecutions at Law for Trifles; in which he knows he that gets
the Victory, always is a Loser: He works too hard for his Money,
and gets it with too much Care and Application, to make Ducks
and Drakes of it when he has done, and throw it away in Gratifi-
cation of his common Resentment: He'll never go to Law for the
Pack'Cloth 'till he spends the Parcel, or sell his Customer for an
empty Box. 115
115. 2 DEFOE, TnE COMPLEAT ENGLISH TRADESmAN 272-73 (2d ed. 1727). De-
foe felt rather strongly that tradesmen should be very easy on their debtors (id.
at 296), perhaps because he became insolvent once himself.
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